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* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for assault by prisoner, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for new trial based on the 
victim's recantation letter, where the victim testified at an evidentiary hearing that he 
testified truthfully at trial and his recantation was coerced by defendant' s friend and brothers? 
Standard of Review. This Court "review[s] the denial of a motion for a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence on the same basis as any other denial of a new trial 
motion—whether the trial court abused its discretion." State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, f 16,994 
P.2d 1237. 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24 is relevant to a determination of this case and the relevant portion 
thereof is reproduced in the text of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged with assault by prisoner, a third degree felony. R. 1. 
Following a p Hminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial. R. 26. A jury 
subsequently convicted defendant as charged. R. 69-71, 87. Thereafter, defendant filed 
motions to arrest judgment and for a new trial based on a letter from the victim to the trial 
judge recanting his trial testimony. R. 90-101.1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court denied defendant's motions. R. 110-11. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate 
prison term of up to five years. R. 118. Defendant timely appealed. R. 124-25. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
The Assault.1 On May 13, 2000, while Mark Pennington was serving time in the 
county jail for assault on a peace officer and other charges, he and defendant became 
embroiled in an argument. T-l: 6-7,10. As the argument continued, defendant doubled up 
his fist and hit Pennington in the abdomen, followed by a blow to Pennington's kidney area. 
lThe letter from Mark Pennington to Judge McKiff, R. 100-01, is reproduced in 
the addendum. 
2Because defendant has not included .n the record on appeal a transcript of the 
trial, the State takes its facts from the preliminary hearing, paginated in the record as T-l. 
2 
T-1:7-8. He hit Pennington two or three more times before leaving for the dining area of the 
jail. T-l:8. Pennington did not defend himself. T-l: 8, 15. 
The Recantation. Two days after the trial, Pennington wrote a letter to Judge McKiff, 
who presided over the trial. R. 100-01 (Addendum). In that letter, he stated that he "did not 
want to testify against [defendant]," but that officers told him that he would be "put in a Utah 
State Prison if [he] did not testify." R. 100. He explained that he held nothing against 
defendant and that he wanted to "just live [his] life with no problems." R. 100. Finally, he 
alleged that he "never wanted anything to happen [b]ecause nothing ever did." R. 100. 
After defendant moved for a new trial based on the letter, the trial court held an 
evidentiary hearing. See R. 90-94, 100-01, 110-11; T-2.3 At the hearing, Pennington 
confirmed that he testified truthfully at the trial. T-2: 7,10. He explained that on the night 
following the trial, defendant's two younger brothers and a family friend assailed him in the 
Albertson's parking lot and told him to write the letter "or harm would come to my family 
and me." T-2: 7-8,21,28. The next day, he was driven to defendant's mother's house. T-2: 
9-10,29. After speaking with her, Pennington wrote the letter to Judge McKiff, which was 
later delivered to him by defendant's mother. T-2: 9-10, 29,40. Pennington also testified 
that at the behest of defendant's friend, he telephoned defendant's attorney with the 
3The transcript of the evidentiary hearing is paginated as T-2. 
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recantation as well. T-2: 11-12. Pennington testified that he complied with these demands 
because of the threats made against him and his family. See T-2: 15; see also T-2: 30.4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, defendant must 
demonstrate that the evidence: (1) "could not, with reasonable diligence, have been 
discovered and produced at trial," (2) "is not merely cumulative," and (3) "make[s] a 
different result probable on retrial." State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, at f 16, 994 P.2d 1237 
(other internal quotes omitted). Only the third prong of the test is at issue on appeal. In 
concluding that the victim's recantation letter did not make a different result probable on 
retrial, the trial court properly considered the victim's credibility, the substance of the letter 
itself, and the evidence at trial. Defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court abused 
its discretion in assessing those factors and denying his motion for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court may "grant a 
new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party." Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). "Trial judges are given 
a wide range of discretion in determining whether newly discovered evidence . . . merit[s] 
4Pennington also testified that after the assault, he tried to contact defense counsel 
because defendant pounded on the cell wall and passed him notes indicating that his 
attorney would get him "off of a bunch of charges" if he dropped the charge against him. 
T-2: 30-32. At defendant's behest, Pennington flushed the notes. T-2: 31. 
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the grant of a new trial." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991). Indeed, this Court 
will "assume that the trial court exercised proper discretion unless the record clearly shows 
the contrary." Id. Defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court acted outside its 
discretion in denying his motion for a new trial and his claim on appeal must therefore fail. 
A. THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE TEST. 
The test for determining whether a recantation of trial testimony merits a new trial is 
the same used for any newly discovered evidence. "[T]he moving party must demonstrate 
from the proffered evidence that: 4(i) it could not, with reasonable diligence, have been 
discovered and produced at the trial; (ii) it is not merely cumulative; and (iii) it must make 
a different result probable on retrial.'" State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, f 16, 994 P.2d 1237 
(quoting State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72, f 5,984 P.2d 975). Because the first two criteria of 
the test were not at issue below, see T-2:62, this appeal turns on the third criterion—whether 
the newly discovered evidence "make[s] a different result probable on retrial," Loose, 2000 
UT 11, at J 16. 
In State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, 994 P.2d 1237, the Utah Supreme Court established 
the framework for determining whether newly discovered evidence makes a different result 
probable on retrial. In that case, the defendant was convicted of sodomy on a child and 
sexual abuse of a child, largely upon the testimony of the victim. Id. at fflj 5-7. After trial, 
the victim wrote a letter to a friend indicating she had lied while testifying. Id. at ^ 1. 
Defendant moved for a new trial based on that letter. Id. At an evidentiary hearing on the 
motion, the victim retreated from the statement in her letter, maintaining that her trial 
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testimony was true and explaining that the letter was simply an attempt to cause problems for 
her mother. Id. at f 17. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, finding that the 
victim was not truthful in her letter and accepting her explanation for writing the letter. Id. 
The Supreme Court recognized that in determining whether newly discovered 
evidence would make a different result probable on retrial, the trial court must necessarily 
determine the "probable weight" of the evidence. See id. at ^ 18. The Court held that in 
making that determination, the trial court should consider several factors, including (1) "the 
substance of the proffered testimony," (2) "the likelihood that a jury would find [the newly 
discovered evidence] credible," and (3) "the other evidence offered at [ ] trial." Id; accord 
State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, f 28,20 P.3d 265. The Court held that the "interplay" among 
these facts will be determinative of the issue. Id. After considering these factors, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, finding that the recantation letter did 
not make a different result probable "where the witness would not recant under oath, 
maintained that her trial testimony was true and that the recantation was false, and gave a 
cogent explanation for the recantation." Id. 
B. DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THAT THE RECANTATION DOES NOT MAKE A 
DIFFERENT RESULT PROBABLE ON RETRIAL. 
Defendant here contends that "if Mr. Pennington testifies according to his letter at a 
retrial of this case, a different result is probable." Aplt. Brf. at 3. On this proposition alone 
he rests his argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial. He neither 
examines the substance of the letter, the probable credibility of Pennington, nor the evidence 
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introduced at the trial. On the other hand, the tnal court examined each of these factors and 
properly concluded that the letter would not make a different result probable on retrial. 
1. Defendant Has Not Challenged the Trial Court's Finding That the 
Recantation in the Letter Was "Very Weak." 
Consistent with Loose, the trial court considered the substance of Pennington'-, li lln 
and found that t'v r^cantati^- 'herein was "verv weak " T-2: 62. A review of the letter 
s . . • . .„ ,cUc; read a.-, n.ii^ws: 
| To Judqe McKiff 
J My name is Mark Aaron Pennington. I was a witness in court on Sept. \ 
21, 2000 on David Taylor. I came to make this statement on my own i 
free will. I did not want to testify agenst [sic] David. But some j 
officers told me I would be put in a Utah State Prison if I did n * 
j testify. I told Don Brown I did not want to testify and he said "Wei 
j you have too [s ic ] . . . I t is to [sic] late to turn Back!" And so with tfc.s 
I was sapeanad [sic] to testify. The Officer also told me "We need 
| you to put this son of a Bitch away for a long time!" I have Tryed [sic] \ 
| to stop this mayham [sic] but I was brow beaten into it. I would like 
to also say that I have nothing against David Taylor. He is not the 
j problem. The court should look at the Polic [sic] officers for 
j discrimanation [sic] against an inmate. I did what I was made to do 
j not upon my own free will. All I wanted is to Just live my life with no 
j problems. But Sevier County Officers pushed me into this and I 
! never wanted anything to happen Because nothing ever did! Thank you 
Mark Aaron Pennington. I 
Isl j 
Sept 23 2000 \ 
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R. 100 (Addendum). As noted by the trial court, "[t]he primary thrust of the [letter] is the 
defendant wanting to avoid trouble." T-2: 63. Twice defendant indicates in the letter that 
he does "not want to testify." R. 100. He then states that he tried to "stop this mayham 
[sic]." R. 100. He goes on to state that he has nothing against defendant, that he did not 
testify at trial of his own free will, and that he wants to just "live [his] life with no problems." 
R. 100. Throughout, he contends that he was pressured into testifying. R. 100. Not until the 
final three words of his statement does Pennington appear to deny that an assault occurred, 
stating that "I never wanted anything to happen Because [sic] nothing ever did!" R. 100. 
The trial court's finding that the recantation was "very weak" is thus supported by the 
evidence and defendant has not demonstrated otherwise. 
2. Defendant Has Not Challenged the Trial Court's Finding That the 
Victim's Testimony at the Evidentiary Hearing Was Credible. 
After defendant filed his motion for a new trial, the court held an evidentiary 
hearing—wholly ignored by defendant on appeal. R. 107, 110-12; T-2. At that hearing, 
Pennington confirmed the veracity of his trial testimony, stated that the letter was not true, 
and explained that he wrote it because of threats made against him and his family. T-2:7-10, 
15. The court also heard testimony from defendant and his mother. See T-2: 33-45. After 
hearing that testimony, the trial court accepted Pennington's explanation for writing the 
letter, finding "Mr. Pennington's testimony [ ] to be credible." T-2: 62. 
Defendant not only fails to challenge the trial court's finding, but fails to acknowledge 
the testimony altogether. See Aplt. Brf. at 2-4. He claims that the trial court should have 
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granted a new trial "because if Mr. Pennington testifies according to his letter ai a ^inu, ^ 
this case, a different result is probable " * p It. Brf. at 3 That outcome, however, is 
improbable gb • en Pennington' s repudiation of the letter at the e\ identiaiy hearing 
because Defendant Did Not Include a I ranscript of the Trial in the 
Record on Appeal, the Evidence at Trial Is Presumed to Support the 
Court's Denial of the Motion for a New Trial. 
finally, the u .a* cour4, ron^idered the testimony -f the witnesses •' Ji :V v kr* ;nc 
t ' i • yC: .: ^ 
defen(jant and Pennington testified at the trial and that conflicts cxistm) in thru ivsini i n 
T-2:62. The court also observed, however; that there were some corroborating witnesses and 
that the jury ultimatel 
Notwith 
a new trial and Loose fs requirement 'that trial testimony be considered, defendant did not 
include a transcript of the trial in the record on appeal V Imhout knowing the evidence 
intnuluieil at line (iiiiiii.il, this ( ouil cannot determine whether lliat evidence rendered any 
subsecuem * * 
recorded confession). The minutes of the jury 'trial indicate that in addition to Pennington, 
two other witnesses testified on behalf of the State: Russell G Grooms during the State's 
case in-i hid mini I h*\nti i I wvy. I Liru .mill i lining I lie ilLilt,1 . lu'llnjlil.il we II1 ll I llir IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII 
also indicate that an audio tape of a telephone conversation was admitted in the State's case-
in-chief and was played "for the jur> R. 70. Howe\ er, absent a transcript of the trial, the 
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Court is powerless to determine the impact of the letter or a subsequent recantation by the 
victim. 
Where, as here, an appellant "fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, [this 
Court] will presume the correctness of the proceeding below." State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 
131 (Utah App. 1997). Accordingly, this Court must presume that the trial evidence, apart 
from the victim's testimony, supported the trial court's determination that the recantation 
would not make a different result probable on retrial. 
* * * 
In sum, the probable weight of Pennington's recantation was severely undermined by 
the less-than-persuasive nature of the recantation itself, Pennington's subsequent testimony 
reaffirming his trial testimony, the trial court's finding that Pennington was credible, and the 
other evidence introduced at trial. Therefore, as in Loose, the trial court below did not abuse 
its discretion in denying defendant's motion for new trial "where the witness would not 
recant under oath, maintained that [his] trial testimony was true and that the recantation was 
false, and gave a cogent explanation for the recantation." See Loose, 2000 UT 11, at ^  18. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
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Respectfully submitted this J 7 day of June, 2002. 
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UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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